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Abstract—This paper investigates energy efficiency for two-
tier femtocell networks through combining game theory and
stochastic learning. With the Stackelberg game formulation, a
hierarchical reinforcement learning framework is applied to
study the joint average utility maximization of macrocells and
femtocells subject to the minimum signal-to-interference-plus-
noise-ratio requirements. The macrocells behave as the leaders
and the femtocells are followers during the learning procedure.
At each time step, the leaders commit to dynamic strategies
based on the best responses of the followers, while the followers
compete against each other with no further information but the
leaders’ strategy information. In this paper, we propose two
learning algorithms to schedule each cell’s stochastic power levels,
leading by the macrocells. Numerical experiments are presented
to validate the proposed studies and show that the two learning
algorithms substantially improve the energy efficiency of the
femtocell networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapidly rising energy consumption and greater aware-
ness of environmental protection have created an urgent need
for energy-efficient wireless communication techniques. In
wireless cellular networks, the radio access part is the main
source of energy consumption, accounting for up to more
than 70% [1]. Therefore, it’s crucial to increase the energy
efficiency in wireless access networks to meet the challenges
raised by the exponential growth in mobile services and energy
consumption.
Recently, femtocells have been considered as a promising
technique for improving the indoor experience of the mobile
users. Due to the short transmit-receive distance property,
femtocell technique can greatly lower transmit power, prolong
handset battery life, and achieve improved reception [2].
Although femtocells bring significant benefits to both mobile
operators and costumers, to make the deployment feasible,
there still exist many technical challenges, e.g., cross-tier/co-
tier interference management. In [3], the authors proposed a
distributed utility-based signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) adaptation algorithm to alleviate the cross-tier inter-
ference at the macrocell from co-channel femtocells. In [4],
a Stackelberg game was formulated to study the resource
allocation in two-tier femtocell networks, where the macro
base station (MBS) protects itself by pricing the interference
from femtocell users (FUs).
This paper discusses the energy efficiency in femtocell
networks. In [5], the problem of energy-efficient spectrum
sharing and power allocation in cognitive radio femtocells
was studied, where a three-stage Stackelberg game model was
formulated to improve the energy efficiency. In [6], the authors
proposed a novel energy saving procedure for the femtocell
base station (FBS) to decide when to switch on/off. Moreover,
we focus mainly on discussing the co-channel operation of
femtocells with closed access. The interference in this sce-
nario can not be handled by means of centralized network
scheduling, because the number and locations of femtocells are
unknown. For such considered networking environment, the
femtocells are most likely to be autonomous. Existing research
works on reinforcement learning (RL) [7] have been carried
out in femtocelss networks. In [8], a realtime multi-agent RL
algorithm that optimizes the network performance by man-
aging the interference in femtocell networks was proposed.
In [9], a distributed learning scheme based on Q-learning
was developed to manage the femto-to-macrocell cross-tier
interference in femtocell networks.
In this paper, we model the energy efficiency aspect of
power allocation problem in femtocell networks as a Stackel-
berg learning game, or leader-follower learning process, with
the following characteristics: 1) the macrocells are considered
to be the leaders, whereas the femtocells are considered to be
the followers; 2) the leaders behave by knowing the response
of the femtocells to their own strategy decisions; 3) given
the leaders’ decisions, the followers compete with each other.
Learning is accomplished by directly interacting with the
surrounding environment and properly adjusting the strategies
according to the realizations of achieved performance. The
solution of such a learning game is the Stackelberg equilibrium
(SE). If no hierarchy exists during the learning procedure,
the Stackelberg learning game reduces to the non-cooperative
learning game, which is the scenario discussed in [10].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section presents the energy efficiency problem in femtocell
networks. Section III defines a Stackelberg game theoretic
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Fig. 1. Macrocell is underlaid with femtocells located in the coverage of the
macrocell (MBS: macro base station; MU: macrocell user; FBS: femto base
station; FU: femtocell user.).
solution for the users’ hierarchical behaviors. In Section IV,
a Stackelberg learning framework is proposed, and two RL
based algorithms are further derived. The numerical results
are included in Section V, verifying the validity and efficiency
of the proposed algorithms. Finally, we present in Section VI
a conclusion of this paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The network scenario considered in this paper is shown in
Fig. 1, where there exist multiple femtocells and macrocells.
Each macrocell consisting of a MBS and multiple macro
users (MUs), is underlaid with several co-channel femtocells.
In each femtocell, there is one FBS providing service to
femtocell users (FUs). Here we assume the closed policy, since
customers may prefer that policy because of privacy concerns
and limited backhaul bandwidth. Assume same distribution
of femtocells in each macrocell, we concentrate on the case
of one macrocell for simplification without loss of generality.
Suppose N femtocells Bi(i ≥ 1) operate within the coverage
of the macrocell B0. Users of the same macrocell/femtocell
adopt time division multiple access (TDMA) for data trans-
mission, thus causing no interference for each other. In the
following, this paper mainly addresses the uplink transmis-
sions in the cell over a common spectrum band.
Let i ∈ N denote the scheduled user connected to its BS
Bi, where N = {0, 1, . . . , N} refers to the user index set.
Designate the power level of user i as pi ∈ Pi
def
= [pmini , p
max
i ],
the SINR γi of user i at Bi is given by
γi
(
pi, p−i
)
=
hi,ipi∑
j∈N\{i} hj,ipj + σ
2
.
Here −i denote all the users in the set N except user i, σ2
is the variance of background Additive White Gaussian Noise
(AWGN), and {hj,i} is the set of channel gains from user j
to Bi. Each user aims to improve the energy efficiency, which
can be defined as
ξi
(
pi, p−i
)
=
W log2
(
1 + γi
(
pi, p−i
))
pai + pi
,
where W is the spectrum bandwidth, and pai denotes the
additional circuit power consumption of user i during trans-
missions and is independent from the transmission power.
Given the minimum SINR requirement γ∗i chosen to ensure
the adequate QoS, we can express the utility function of the
user i formally as
ui
(
pi, p−i
)
=
{
ξi
(
pi, p−i
)
, if γi
(
pi, p−i
)
≥ γ∗i ;
0, otherwise.
Whenever the macrocell’s γ∗0 becomes infeasible, MU trans-
mits with maximum power level. We propose that the MBS
requests the FUs to reduce their minimum SINR targets. Each
user i ∈ N tries to find the optimal power level pi that
maximizes its utility,
max
pi∈Pi
ui
(
pi, p−i
)
. (1)
III. STACKELBERG GAME THEORETIC SOLUTION
Within the Stakelberg game framework, the MU is modeled
as the leader, while the FUs as the followers competing with
each other over the spectrum. In order to investigate the
existence of an SE, we first define p∗i to be the best response
to p−i if
ui
(
p∗i , p−i
)
≥ ui
(
pi, p−i
)
, ∀pi ∈ Pi.
User i’s best response to p−i is denoted as BRi(p−i). Let
NE(p0) be the Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy of the FUs if
the MU chooses to play p0, i.e.
NE(p0) = p−0, if pi = BRi(p−i), ∀i ∈ N\{0}.
The strategy profile (p∗0,NE(p∗0)) is an SE if and only if
u0 (p
∗
0,NE(p∗0)) ≥ u0 (p0,NE(p0)) , ∀p0 ∈ P0.
The following theorem establishes the existence of the SE.
Theorem 1. The SE always exists in our defined Stackelberg
game with the MU leading and the FUs following.
Proof : For ∀p0 ∈ P0, there is at least one NE in the non-
cooperative game G =
〈
p0,N\{0}, {Pi}, {ui}
〉
, since for
∀i ∈ N\{0}
1) the strategy profile Pi is a non-empty, convex, and
compact subset of some Euclidean space Rn;
2) ui is continuous in p−i and quasi-concave in pi.
Therefore, there exists p∗0 ∈ P0, such that
u0 (p
∗
0,NE (p∗0)) = sup
p0∈P0
u0 (p0,NE(p0)) .
We can conclude that the SE always exists in the defined
Stackelberg game. 
Note that there is only one leader in the Stackelberg
game. The MU regards itself as the leader and performs the
Stackelberg strategy, and the FUs will act their best responses
until reach the equilibrium.
IV. STACKELBERG LEARNING FRAMEWORK
In the Stackelberg learning game, each user in the network
behaves as an intelligent agent, whose objective is to maximize
its expected utility. The game is played repeatedly to achieve
the optimal strategies. The Stackelberg learning framework
has two levels of hierarchy: 1) the MU aims to maximize
its expected utility by knowing the responses of all FUs for
each possible play; 2) given the strategy of the MU, the
FUs play a non-cooperative game among each other. In this
section, we focus our emphasis on how to reach the optimal
communication configuration through RL approach [7].
A strategy for user i ∈ N at time step t is defined to be
a probability vector yti =
(
yti,1, . . . , y
t
i,mi
)
∈ Yi, where yti,j
means the probability with which the user i chooses action
(transmission power) pi,j ∈ Pi, and Yi is the strategy set
available to user i. Since each user can only choose a power
level from a finite discrete set, Pi is assumed to be a finite
set with dimension mi. Then the expected utility for user i at
time slot t can be expressed as follows
Ui
(
yti, yt−i
)
= E
[
ui|user j plays strategy ytj , j ∈ N
]
=
∑
pt∈P
ui
(
pt
) ∏
s∈N
yts,js ,
where pt =
(
pt0,j0 , . . . , p
t
N,jN
)
is the vector of actions chosen
by all users at time t, and P = ×i∈NPi is the set of all action
vectors.
For any stationary strategy1 of the MU y0 ∈ Y0, the best-
response strategies of all FUs define an NE strategy NE(y0),
i.e. NE(y0) = y∗−0, if
y∗i = arg maxyi∈Yi
Ui
(
yi, y−i
)
, ∀i ∈ N\{0}.
The MU’s optimal strategy is then
y∗0 = arg maxy0∈Y0
U0 (y0,NE(y0)) .
Together (y∗0,NE(y∗0)) constitute a stationary strategy of SE
for the Stackelberg learning formulation.
Theorem 2. For the considered Stackelberg learning game,
there exist a MU’s stationary strategy and a FUs’ NE strategy
that form an SE.
Inspired by [11], we can prove Theorem 2 as follows.
Proof: If the MU follows a stationary strategy y0, then
the Stackelberg learning game is simplified to be a N -player
stochastic learning game. It has been shown in [12] that every
finite strategic-form game has a mixed strategy equilibrium,
that is, there always exists a NE(y0) in our formulation of the
discrete power allocation game given the MU’s strategy y0.
The rest of the proof follows directly from the definition of
SE, and is thus omitted for brevity. 
1A strategy is said to be stationary, where yi =
(
yi,1, . . . , yi,mi
)
is not
changing with time during the stochastic learning process.
A. Reinforcement Learning based Algorithm-I (RLA-I)
During the Stackelberg learning process, the MU behaves
as the leader and knows the strategy information of all FUs.
Users with RL ability learn to maximize its individual expected
utility through repeated interactions with the networking en-
vironment. Among many different implementation of above
adaptation mechanism, here we consider the so-called Q-
learning [13], where the users’ strategies are parameterized
through Q-functions that characterize relative expected utility
of a particular power level. More specifically, let Qti (pi,ji)
denote the Q-value of user i’s corresponding power level pi,ji
at time t. Then, after selecting power level pi,ji at time t+1,
the Q-value is updated according to
Qt+1i (pi,ji) = Q
t
i (pi,ji) + α
(
Ui
(
pi,ji , y
t+1
−i
)
−Qti (pi,ji)
)
,
(2)
where α ∈ [0, 1) is the learning rate, and
Ui
(
pi,ji , yt+1−i
)
=
∑
pt+1
−i ∈P−i
ui
(
pi,ji , pt+1−i
) ∏
s∈N\i
yt+1s,js . (3)
Each FU i ∈ N\{0} doesn’t know other competing FUs’
private strategies yt+1−(0,i), and the only information it has is
the MU’s transmission parameters. But the FU i is able to
compute the attainable utility ui(pi,ji , pt+1−i ) with the feedback
information from its receiver. Therefore, FU i can estimate
Ui(pi,ji , y
t+1
−i ) using
U˜ t+1i (pi,ji) =
∑
p
t+1
0,j0
∈P0
yt+10,j0 Û
t+1
i
(
pi,ji , p
t+1
0,j0
)
, (4)
where Û t+1i
(
pi,ji , p
t+1
0,j0
)
is given in Eq. (5). ntpi,ji ,p0,j0 is the
number of times when MU selects power level p0,j0 and FU
i selects power level pi,ji until time slot t. The updating rule
in Eq. (2) can then be rewritten as
Qt+1i (pi,ji) = Q
t
i (pi,ji) + α
(
Ui
(
pi,ji , y
t+1
−i
)
−Qti (pi,ji)
)
, if i = 0;
Qti (pi,ji) + α
(
U˜ t+1i (pi,ji)−Q
t
i (pi,ji)
)
, otherwise.
(6)
Then, we need to specify how the user selects power
levels. Greedy selection, when the action with the highest Q-
value is selected, might generally lead to globally suboptimal
solution. Thus, we need to incorporate some way of exploring
less-optimal strategies. Here, we focus on Boltamann action
selection mechanism, that is, the probability of choosing power
level pi,ji at time t is given by
yt+1i,ji =
exp (Qti (pi,ji) /τi)∑mi
l=1 exp (Q
t
i(pi,l)/τi)
, (7)
where the temperature τi controls the exploration/exploitation
tradeoff [7].
Now we present the reinforcement learning based algorithm-
I for the Stackelberg learning game.
RLA-I
Û t+1i
(
pi,ji , p
t+1
0,j0
)
=

ui
(
pi,ji , p0,j0 , pt+1−(i,0)
)
− Û ti (pi,ji , p0,j0)
ntpi,ji ,p0,j0
+ 1
+ Û ti (pi,ji , p0,j0) , if p
t+1
0,j0
= p0,j0 ;
Û ti
(
pi,ji , p
t+1
0,j0
)
, otherwise.
(5)
Initialization:
t = 0, initialize Q-values Qti(pi,ji ), for ∀i ∈ N and
∀pi,ji ∈ Pi.
Learning:
1) The MU chooses action p0,j0 according to yt0 and
broadcasts its strategy information to all the FUs in the
network.
2) Each FU i ∈ N\{0} selects action pi,ji according to yti
and sends its relevant strategy information to the MBS.
3) Users measure their SINR γi with the feedback infor-
mation of the intended receiver. If γi ≥ γ∗i , then ξi (p)
can be achieved; otherwise, the receiver can not receive
correctly, thus obtains zero.
4) The MU updates Ui
(
pi,ji , yt−i
)
according to Eq. (3);
and the FUs update U˜ ti (pi,ji) basing on Eq. (4) and Eq.
(5).
5) Update Q-values Qti (pi,ji) according to Eq. (6).
6) Update the strategies yt+1i,ji according to Eq. (7).
7) t = t+ 1.
End Learning
The learning algorithm results in a stochastic process of
choosing power level, so we need to investigate the long-term
behavior of the learning procedure. Along with the discussion
in [14], we obtain the following differential equation describ-
ing the evolution of the Q-values:
dQti (pi,ji)
dt =
{
α
(
Ui
(
pi,ji , yt−i
)
−Qti (pi,ji)
)
, if i = 0;
α
(
U˜ ti (pi,ji)−Q
t
i (pi,ji)
)
, otherwise.
(8)
Next, we would like to express the dynamics in terms of
strategies rather than the Q-values. Toward this end, we
differentiate Eq. (7) with respect to t and use Eq. (8). The
set of equations expressed by Eq. (9) can be arrived.
The first term in braces of Eq. (9) asserts that the probability
of choosing power level pi,ji increases with a rate proportional
to the overall efficiency of that strategy, while the second term
describes the BS’s tendency to randomize over possible power
levels. Let Y t = (yt0, . . . , ytN ) the strategy profile of all users
at time t. In the following analysis, we resort to an ordinary
differential equation (ODE) whose solution approximates the
convergence of Y t [15]. Then, as αt → 0, we can represent
the right-hand side of Eq. (9) by a function f (Y t). With any
initial Y 0 = Y0, Y t will converges weakly, as α → 0, to
Y ∗
def
= (y∗0,NE (y∗0)) which is the solution of
dY
dt = f(Y ), Y
0 = Y0. (10)
Theorem 3. RLA-I will always discover an SE strategy.
Proof: We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that the
process generated by Eq. (7) converges to a non-Stackelberg
equilibrium. We know that the equilibrium solution of Eq.
(10) that characterize the long term behavior of RLA-I are by
definition stationary points. This implies that RLA-I will only
converge to stationary points. This means that stationary points
that are not SEs are stable, which contradicting Theorem 2. 
B. Reinforcement Learning based Algorithm-II (RLA-II)
In this subsection, to promote cooperation among the com-
peting FUs, we further design a simple and intuitive rule each
FU has that links the other FUs’ strategies to its own current
transmission strategy. Such a rule reflects an awareness that
there are strategic interactions during the learning procedure.
FUs with such beliefs do not correctly perceive how the future
strategies of their competitors depend on the past. Thus, we
propose a conjecture model concerning the way in which the
FUs react to each other [16].
Each FU i ∈ N\{0} thinks any change in its current
transmission strategy will induce other FUs to make well-
defined changes in the corresponding time slot. Specifi-
cally, we need to express FU i’s expected contention mea-
sure bt+1i
(
pt+1−(0,i)
)
=
∏
s∈N\{0,i} y
t+1
s,js
in Eq. (3) through
b˜t+1i
(
pt+1−(0,i)
)
, that is
b˜t+1i
(
pt+1−(0,i)
)
= bti
(
pt+1−(0,i)
)
− δi
(
yt+1i,ji − y
t
i,ji
)
, (11)
where δi > 0 is the belief factor. In other words, every FU i
believes that a change of yt+1i,ji − y
t
i,ji
in its strategy at time
t+1 will induce a change of δi
(
yt+1i,ji − y
t
i,ji
)
in the expected
contention measure exactly related to the transmission strate-
gies of other FUs. It’s worth mentioning here that although FU
i may be aware that other FUs are subject to many influences
on their strategies, when making its own decision, it is only
concerned with other FUs’ reactions to itself. That means FU i
does not take into account whether or not FU j (j ∈ N\{0, i})
might react to changes in transmission strategy made by FU
l(l ∈ N\{0, i, j}).
Among different possibilities of capturing the expected con-
tention measure b˜t+1i
(
pt+1−(0,i)
)
, the linear model represented
in Eq. (11) is the simplest form based on which one FU can
model the impact of its changes in transmission strategy to
other competing FUs. The conjecture model deployed by the
FUs are based on the concept of reciprocity, which refers to
interaction mechanisms in which the FUs repeatedly interact
when choosing the power level. If they realize that their
probabilities of interacting with each other in the future is high,
they will consider their influence on the strategies of other
FUs, which is captured in the conjecture model by the positive
dyti,ji
dt =

α
τ0
yt0,j0
{[
U0
(
p0,j0 , yt−1−0
)
−
m0∑
l=1
yt0,lU0
(
p0,l, yt−1−0
)]
− τ0
m0∑
l=1
yt0,l ln
(
yt0,j0/y
t
0,l
)}
, if i = 0;
α
τi
yti,ji
{[
U˜ t−1i (pi,ji)−
mi∑
l=1
yti,lU˜
t−1
i (pi,l)
]
− τi
mi∑
l=1
yti,l ln
(
yti,ji/y
t
i,l
)}
, otherwise.
(9)
parameter δi. Otherwise, they will act myopically, which is the
same learning process as in previous Section IV-A.
Following the previous analysis, Eq. (4) thus becomes
U˜ t+1i (pi,ji) =
∑
pt+1
−i
∈P
−i
yt+10,j0ui
(
pi,ji , pt+1−i
)
b˜t+1i
(
pt+1−(0,i)
)
,
(12)
Therefore, we propose RLA-II by replacing U˜ t+1i (pi,ji) in Eq.
(6) with Eq. (12) to discover the SE strategy. RLA-II is similar
to RLA-I except that the FUs update their Q-values based on
Eq. (4) in RLA-I.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We provide insight into the performance comparison of
the both learning algorithms through simulation experiments.
We consider multiple FUs coexisting with one MU over a
spectrum with bandwidth of 1MHz. The minimum SINR
targets of MU and FUs are set to be 3dB and 5dB, respectively.
The noise of the measurement is according to a zero-mean
Gaussian noise with the power of σ2 = −110dBm. For
simplicity, we suppose that the belief factors δi are all equal to
2, ∀i ∈ N\{0}, i.e., the FUs have the same conjecture ability,
and the additional circuit power consumption is 10dBm for all
users. The femtocells are assumed to be uniformly distributed
within a circle centered at the MBS with radius of 500m.
The coverage radius of femtocell is 20m. The channel gains
are generated by a log-normal shadowing path loss model,
hi,j = d
−n
i,j , where di,j is the distance between user i and
BS j, and n is the path loss exponent. In simulation, n is
assumed to be 4. The action set of transmission power levels
for all users is {20, 25, 30}dBm.
Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the learning process of
expected utilities for each user in the network. The results
are compared with
1) The fully cooperative power allocation game with com-
plete information case: each user knows all the utility
functions and transmission power levels in the network,
and then the optimal utilities in the power allocation
process can be calculated by each user according to
Eq. (1). This scenario is equivalent to the classic power
control game in femtocell networks without the pricing
schemes from macrocells as shown in [3].
2) The non-cooperative learning process of the power con-
trol game without any information exchange case: each
user’s transmission decisions in the learning process
are self-incentive with myopic best response correspon-
dence, which is the scenario discussed in [10].
The first observation from our simulation results is that,
whenever we generate random initial probability distributions
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Fig. 3. Learning process of the expected utilities for FU 2.
of the power levels, the equilibrium state of the transmission
strategies achieved by all users is independent of these initial
values. That is, there exists an SE in the Stackelberg learning
game, which confirms Theorem 2.
Secondly, we can find from the curves that the expected
utilities of all users in the learning process will finally converge
(or approach) to the equilibrium point in the complete cooper-
ation case, and these simulation results validate the conclusion
of Theorem 3. In addition, both the proposed reinforcement
learning schemes outperform the non-cooperative case, this is
because for a Stackelberg learning game, knowing more can
improve not only the leader’s (MU) own utility, but also the
utilities of the followers (FUs). Meanwhile, the RLA-II can
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achieve better performance than RLA-I, which is due to the
fact that all FUs have the incentive to achieve better utilities
thus behave reciprocally at some extent.
Fig. 5 shows the expected SINRs of FUs using RLA-
I and RLA-II, respectively, versus the minimum macrocell
QoS requirement γ∗0 . It is observed that for the same γ∗0 ,
the expected SINRs of the FUs with RLA-II is in general
higher than that with RLA-I. This is in accordance with our
previous discussions. It is also worth mentioning that when γ∗0
is sufficiently large, the expected SINRs of the FUs approach
to zero for the two learning algorithms. This is because when
γ∗0 is sufficiently large, there is no femtocell active in the
network.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, energy efficiency is investigated for the uplink
transmission in a spectrum-sharing-based two-tier femtocell
network using stochastic learning theory. The Stackelberg
learning framework is adopted to jointly study the utility
maximization of the MU and FUs. Based on reinforcement
learning, we propose two algorithms, namely, RLA-I and RLA-
II, whose convergence has been further proven theoretically.
Numerical experiments illustrate that the reciprocity-inspired
RLA-II converges more quickly and achieves better perfor-
mance compared to RLA-I and the non-cooperative learning
scheme. This comes at the expense of more side information
at the FUs. Concludingly, both learning algorithms show the
potential in improving the energy efficiency in the femtocell
networks.
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